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Abstract
Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs) are Wireless Sensor
Networks characterized by sporadic sink presence and operation in hostile
settings. The absence of the sink for period of time, prevents sensor nodes
to offload data in real time and offer greatly increased opportunities for
attacks resulting in erasure, modification, or disclosure of sensor-collected
data. In this paper, we focus on UWSNs where sensor nodes collect and
store data locally and try to upload all the information once the sink
becomes available. One of the most relevant issues pertaining UWSNs is
to guarantee a certain level of information survivability in an unreliable
network and even in presence of a powerful attackers. In this paper,
we first introduce an epidemic-domain inspired approach to model the
information survivability in UWSN. Next, we derive a fully distributed
algorithm that supports these models and give the correctness proofs.
1 Introduction
Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSNs), which have been introduced
by Di Pietro et al. in [8], are WSNs characterized by the sporadic presence of the
sink. These UWSNs are useful for instance to detect poaching in a national park,
or as a monitoring system to check the pressure of an underground pipeline,
as stated in [18]. In such networks, nodes collect data from the area under
consideration, and then they try to upload all the stored data when the sink
comes around. It is motivated by the scenarios where only historical information
or digest data, not real-time data, are of interest. For example, what is average
temperature during last three months; what is the highest and lowest humidity
degree during last 24 hours; or more specifically, what is average content of a
chemical element in soil during last half year [26].
Due to the absence of a direct and alive connection with the sink, these
networks are more subject to malicious attacks than traditional WSNs. Sen-
sor nodes may malfunction due to some threats, e.g., physical failure such as
melting, corroding or getting smashed, and more sophisticated, mobile adver-
sary attacks. Some data may be lost, erased or modified before the arrival
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of the mobile collectors, which significantly affects functionalities of UWSNs.
Therefore, the critical issue for UWSNs is how to maximize information sur-
vivability [16]: the dimension of the area is often prohibitive in such networks,
while the absence of the sink facilitates the work of attackers. Data or infor-
mation survivability consists on preserving data for a long period of time in the
face of attacks, which is crucial for designing safe UWSNs.
To ensure data survivability, cryptographic or noncryptographic approaches
can be used. End-to-end encryption schemes that support operations over
cypher-text have been proved important for private party sensor network im-
plementations or other security schems [1, 23, 24]. Unfortunately, nowadays
these methods are very complex and not completely suitable for sensor nodes
having limited resources. Non-cryptographic approaches are suitable for low-
cost sensors, that do not have the capability to execute computational intensive
calculation. In this paper, we will focus on non-cryptographic approaches for
data survivability. We propose an epidemic-domain inspired approach to model
the information survivability in UWSN.
The model we present here is based on both SIR (Susceptible - Infected -
Recovered) and SIS (Susceptible - Infected - Susceptible) models. A node is sus-
ceptible to a data item when it is online and functioning normally; he can receive
the information that must survive. Intuitively, the model we focus on resembles
an SIR model studied previously in [10, 18]. Our novelty is that we study arbi-
trary dynamic network topologies instead of static networks. In a next step, we
provide a fully distributed algorithm which supports/covers different epidemic
models. The aim of this algorithm is to ensure data survivability in UWSN by
maintaining a subset of safe nodes in working state while replacing/locking the
attacked ones when needed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly re-
views the related work. The SIR model for Data Survivability in UWSNs is
presented in Section 3. Section 4 details the proposed epidemic schemes in a
comparatively manner. We present in section 5 the design and analysis of the
proposed epidemic algorithm and give the proofs. The next section is devoted
to numerical simulations. Finally, Section 7 concludes this research work.
2 Previous work
Wireless sensor networks have attracted a lot of interest over the last decade, for
quick and efficient aggregation of information [4, 3], for understanding "trust"
and "distrust" in online networks [2, 1, 11], and in several other areas. In most
previous researches on WSNs, sensed data are assumed to be collected in a real-
time manner and sensor nodes always connected to the sink that is generally the
only unconditionally trusted entity. In order to extending the network lifetime
a possible solution presented in the literature and consists on using mobile sinks
or robots to perform several tasks instead of the nodes themselves. For instance,
the authors in [6, 5] propose a mobile beacon based approach to localize sensor
nodes and ensure the network coverage. In [25], a distributed algorithm is pro-
2
posed in order to reduce the overhead message by using only local information
and assisted by mobile sinks. Recently, a number of approaches exploiting sink
mobility for data collection in WSNs have been proposed [14, 22, 21, 15]. The
main objective of these work is to reduce the energy consumption by optimizing
the number of communications between nodes. In these approaches only single
hop communication is required between nodes and the mobile sinks. Otherwise,
in some cases and scenarios sensor nodes can not be connected for a short or
long period of time and the network is left unattended while sensor nodes can-
not offload data in real time. Therefore, sensor nodes wait for the new passing
of a mobile sink for examle to send their data. Unattended Wireless Sensor
Networks (UWSNs), have been introduced by Di Pietro et al. in [8], where ad-
versaries can compromise some sensor nodes and selectively destroy data. Other
works have studied this problem in order to prevent such attacks, and ensure
the "data survivability" in UWSN.
The authors in [17] proposed a method to face an adversary that indiscrim-
inately erases all sensor data, and then in [9] cryptographic techniques that
prevent the adversary from recognizing data that it aims to erase have been
introduced. Sensor cooperation to achieve self-healing in stationary UWSNs
has been explored in [16]. [20] proposes a new strategy based on the concept
of secure multi-party protocols. The main advantages of the proposed strategy
are not limited to the security, since it preserves privacy, enables the use of
data aggregation and enforces a level of trust among nodes, which collaborate
to compute aggregation functions. In [19], the authors propose a dependable
and efficient data survival scheme to maximize the data survival degree upon
data retrieval. This technique makes use of computational secret sharing to
achieve fault tolerance and compromise resilience, and uses network coding to
further improve communication efficiency. In [7], the authors focus on the con-
ditions under which a sensor node can survive in an unreliable network. They
propose and solve the problem using non-linear dynamical systems and fixed
point stability theorems.
The epidemiology community has developed the so-called SIR and SIS mod-
els [10, 18] of infection. The SIS model (Susceptible - Infected - Susceptible)
is suitable for, e.g., the common flu, where nodes may be infected, healed (and
susceptible), and infected again. The SIR model (Susceptible - Infected - Recov-
ered) is suitable for, say, mumps, where a node, after being infected, becomes
recovered (with life-time immunity). SIS, SIR, and SIRS models have been in-
vestigated by authors of these research works, in order to derive the parameters
that can assure information to survive. In these articles, S(t) compartment is
constituted by sensors that do not possess the datum at time t, while I(t) is
the compartment of sensors that possess it. Finally, the R(t) compartment is
constituted by sensors that have been compromised by the attacker.
On the other side and surprisingly, the authors in [10, 18] never consider
that in a wireless sensor network, nodes’ energy is provided by a battery that
can be emptied due to data acquisition, transmission, or simply functioning
cost of keeping alive. More precisely, the topology of the networks they consider
is static, the network’s lifetime is unbounded, and sensors cannot die due to
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empty batteries. Indeed, their work is more related to unattended wired sensor
networks, on main power but not with a battery as S+I (SIS model) or S+I+R
(SIR and SIRS models) are constant. Our intention is to deepen their interesting
work, by bringing their proposal from wired sensor networks to WSNs, refining
theirs models, and producing more theoretical results on each model.
3 A SIR model for Data Survivability in UWSNs
3.1 Introducing the Kermack & McKendrick model
In this section, the SIR model formerly presented in [10, 18] is firstly recalled.
Then, consumption hypotheses underlined in this model are precised while the-
oretical results on the behavior of the compartments of the network are further
investigated.
In unattended wireless sensor networks the presence of the sink is sporadic.
However the duration between two visits of the sink to the network (its ab-
sence) can sometimes be considered negligible, in a first approximation, com-
pared to the time required to empty a sensor battery. In such UWSNs, the
death processes of sensors can be neglected if the aim is to study the immedi-
ate consequences of an attack between two visits of the sink. Under such an
assumption, the global network can be divided in three compartments, namely
the sensors S susceptible to receive the datum of interest (intrusion detection,
etc.), the ones that currently store it I, and the recovered sensors R that have
been compromised by the attacker: their stored datum has been recovered.
Suppose now that between S and I, the transmission rate is bI, where b is
the contact rate, which is the probability of transferring the information in a
contact between a susceptible sensor and a sensor having the datum. Indeed,
as proven by Di Pietro et al., such a situation occurs when then wireless sensor
network is composed by n sensor, and if each sensor forwards the datum with
probability α
n
[10, 18] (α is the transition rate).
Suppose additionally that the rate to pass between I and R, is c: the attacker
is able to individuate the sensors containing the target information, and to
destroy each of them with this probability c. Notice that, if the duration of the
information survivability is D, then c = 1D , as a sensor experiences one recovery
in D units of time.
S I R
bI c
Figure 1: SIR model
Under such hypotheses and as stated in [10, 18], the sensors population
follows the so-called SIR model of Kermack & McKendrick [13] depicted in
Figure 1. Remark that the total sensors population is equal to N = S+I+R =
S0 + I0 +R0, which is a constant: the number of awaken, alive sensors does not
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evolve. In particular, only two of the three populations of sensors have to be
studied.
3.2 Firsts theoretical results
Consider now that x(t) = X(t)
N
denotes the fraction of individuals in the com-
partment X. The SIR model can be expressed by the following set of ordinary
non-linear differential equations:
ds
dt
= −bis
di
dt
= bis− ci
dr
dt
= ci.
(1)
Obviously, the typical time between transmissions is Tt = b−1 while the
typical time until attack when having the information is equal to Te = c−1.
Thus
Tt
Te
= c
b
is the average number of transmissions between a sensor having the datum and
others before it lost this information due to the attacker. Such a statement
explain why, in the SIR historical model, the dynamics of the infectious class
depends on the reproduction ratio defined by
R0 =
b
c
,
which corresponds here to the expected number of new informed sensors (so-
called “secondary infections”) providing a single sensor with the datum where
all sensors are susceptible. Furthermore, direct standard analysis manipulations
(variables separation and then integration) lead to the following form for the
susceptible sensors compartment: s(t) = s(0)exp (−R0(r(t)− r(0))).
As di
dt
= (R0s − 1)ci, if the basic reproduction number satisfies R0 > 1
s(0) ,
there will be an information outbreak with an increasing number of sensors with
the datum. In other words, R0 determines whether or not the information will
spread through the network.
All these facts are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 Consider a sensor network that aims to monitor a given area,
and that has to spread an alert or an information to a sink, whose presence
is sporadic. Suppose that an attacker tries to remove the datum in sensors’
memory, and that:
1. all sensor activities are negligible, in terms of energy,
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2. when a sensor has the datum, it spreads the information to its neighbors
with a probability b, until being attacked.
Denote by Tt the typical time between transmissions, Te the typical time an
informed sensor loses its information due to the attacker, and by s(0) the ini-
tial fraction of susceptible sensors. So the information will spread through the
network if and only if Tt < s(0)Te.
In other words, this proposition states that if the reproduction ratio is greater
than one, then an “epidemic” occurs since the prevalence (the infected ratio)
increases to a peak and then decreases to zero. Otherwise there is no epidemic
since the prevalence decreases to zero.
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Figure 2: Phase space (s, i) with b = 0.4, c = 0.15 (SIR model).
It is possible to be more precise in the formulation of Proposition 1, following
an approach similar to [12].
Proposition 2 The fraction s(t) of sensors susceptible to receive the informa-
tion is a decreasing function. The limiting value s(∞) is the unique root in
(0, Te
Tt
) of the equation
1− r(0)− s(∞) + Te
Tt
ln
(
s(∞)
s(0)
)
.
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Additionally,
• if Tt > s(0)Te, then the fractional number i(t) of sensors having the datum
decreases to zero as t→∞,
• else i(t) first increases up to a maximum value equal to
1 − r(0) − Te
Tt
(
1 + ln
(
s(0)Tt
Te
))
and then decreases to zero as t → ∞,
where ln stands for the natural logarithm.
Proof The triangle T = {(s, i) | s > 0, i > 0, s+ i 6 1} is positively invariant,
since from the SIR equations, it holds: s = 0 ⇒ s′ = 0, i = 0 ⇒ i′ = 0, and
s + i = 1 ⇒ (s + i)′ = −ci 6 0. Furthermore, points on the s axis where
i = 0 are equilibrium ones, unstable for s > 1/R0 and stable otherwise. s is
decreasing and positive due to this invariance and because ds
dt
= −bis, so an
unique limit s(∞) exists. Similarly, r′(t) = ci > 0 and r 6 1 then r(∞) exists.
As s + i + r = 1, i(∞) exists too. To prove that this limit is null, we only
remark that if i(∞) > 0, then r(∞) = ∞ (because r′ > ci(∞)2 for sufficiently
large t), which is impossible, as r 6 1. Finally, the equations of the proposition
are derived from ds
di
= c
bs
− 1.
The phase space of the solutions of the SIR system with given parameters is
provided in Figure 6 while the evolution of s and i is depicted in Figure 10. The
results presented in this section hold for a transition rate between susceptible
and informed sensors having the form F = ai, which thus represents the force of
information. Nonlinear forces of information, or infection, can be investigated
too, to model more realistically the information survivability.
3.3 Another understandings for the Recovered compart-
ment
In the previous section, the R compartment was constituted by sensors that
have been compromised by the attacker, which will be referred in what follows
as situation 1. It is possible to attribute at least two other understandings to
this compartment, for an unattended wireless sensor network whose lifetime is
dependent on energy consumption and in absence of attacks.
This compartment can be constituted by dead sensors, when considering
that the sole action on the energy is the information transmission, and that
the unique way to death for a sensor is to have too much transmitted the
datum. In other words, in this Situation 2, sensors send information messages
to their neighbors until emptying totally their batteries. The sink will receive
the information when it will interrogate the network at time t if I(t) 6= 0.
A third situation can be considered without any changes in formalization, ex-
cept redefining the meaning of the R compartment. Indeed, it can be interesting
to consider that a sensor is first susceptible to receive an information message
7
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Figure 3: Evolution of the fractions s and i of susceptible and having the datum
sensors with b = 0.4, c = 0.15, s(0) = 0.9, and i(0) = 0.1 (SIR model).
for a while, then in a second time it has and transmit the information, before
finally entering into the third age of its life, the recovered state in which it will
lose its ability to transmit the information. Materials of the previous section
tackles too this scenario, when considering the network lifetime sufficiently large
compared to information spreading, in order to neglect sensors’ death due to
energy consumption. The question here is to determine the quantity of informed
sensors on large timescales.
Let us now explain how to extend such a compartmental study for data
survivability in wireless sensor networks to well-known SIS models.
3.4 A few words about SIS models
Other compartmental divisions of the set of sensors can be investigating, leading
for instance to a SIS epidemic model [13]. This latter assumes only two com-
partments named Susceptible (S) and Infected (I). Transitions between these
compartments are represented in Figure 4. An individual that is susceptible
to a disease becomes infected with a certain probability a, while an infected
individual immediately becomes susceptible once (and if) it is cured of an in-
fection (which happens with probability b). Note that a healthy individual can
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contract a disease only if it is in contact with a sick one. Thus, the evolution of
this system is completely described by the following two differential equations
(total sensor population: P = S + I = S0 + I0, which is a constant).
dI
dt
= aSI − bI I(0) = I0
dS
dt
= bI − aSI S(0) = S0
The SIS model may be treated the same as the SIR model, which has been
detailed in this section. For the sake of concision, and as this study does not
raise any complication, this model will be left as an exercise, while energy con-
sumption will now be investigated in the next section.
S I
aI
b
Figure 4: SIS model
4 Considering Energy Consumption for Data Sur-
vivability in UWSNs
In a large amount of situations, energy consumption and the death of sensors
cannot be neglected, this is why a “natural” death rate for all compartments is
introduced in this section. Such an approach generalizes the models presented
previously.
4.1 A SIR model with natural death rate
S I R
bI c
m
(a) Situation 2
S I R
bI c
m m’ m
(b) Situations 1 and 3
Figure 5: SIR models with natural death rate
The previous section considers that all sensor activities are negligible, in
terms of energy, except the transmission of information in situations 2 and 3,
which is reasonable in a first approximation. It is however possible to refine the
SIR model in these two last situations, in order to consider that sensors’ energy
decreases too in absence of information transmission.
9
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(a) Situation 2
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(b) Situations 1 and 3
Figure 6: Phase space (s, i) with b = 0.4, c = 0.15,m = 0.01, SIR model with
natural death rate in Situation 3.
In Situation 2, the R compartment of the SIR model is constituted by dead
sensors. This compartment is populated by susceptible nodes that have natu-
rally died (death rate m) without having received the datum and by sensors of
the I compartment which die at another rate c supposed to be greater than m,
as they have to transfer the datum, an energy-consuming task. This situation
is depicted in Figure 5(a).
In the two other situations investigated in this research work, the R compart-
ment is constituted by living sensors that do not transmit the datum anymore,
either because they have been corrupted and thus have lost it (first situation),
or because their batteries is preserved (third one). This new situation is closed
to the SIR model of Figure 1, except that a the new network is characterized by
a death rate for each sensors compartment (see Figure 5(b)). Notice that the
death rate m′ of the I compartment is a priori different from the one of S and
R compartments, as it is reasonable to suppose that the datum transmission
implies more energy consumption. However, setting m′ = m is possible too.
The SIR model of Equation (1) can be adapted as follows for Situation 2:
ds
dt
= −bis−ms
di
dt
= bis− ci
dr
dt
= ci+ms,
(2)
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while it has the following form in Situations 1 and 3:
ds
dt
= −bis−ms
di
dt
= bis− ci−m′i
dr
dt
= ci−mr.
(3)
Let us now investigate the long-term behavior of these models. Regarding
Situation 2, it is natural to think that, for large timescales, all sensors will
take place in the third R compartment of died sensors, as all the batteries
are continually emptied (either due to natural consumption or because of the
information transmission). This can be easily proven by considering that in an
equilibrium point (s∗, i∗, r∗ = 1− s∗ − i∗), we have ds
dt
= di
dt
= dr
dt
= 0, and so (bi
∗ +m)s∗ = 0
(bs∗ − c)i∗ = 0
ci∗ +ms∗ = 0.
As c > 0,m > 0, i∗ > 0, and s∗ > 0, we can conclude from the third equation
above that s∗ = i∗ = 0, and so r∗ = 1. The Jacobian is equal to
J(s, i, r) =
 −bi−m −bs 00 bs− c 0
m c 0

and its characteristic polynomial in (0, 0, 1) is λ(λ + c)(λ + m). The eigen-
values being negative, the equilibrium (0, 0, 1) is attractive. These results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider an unattended wireless sensor network divided in three
sets of sensors, the first category S being susceptible to receive a given datum,
the second one I having and transmitting this latter, and the third one R being
constituted by dead sensors.
Suppose that the death rate is m for S compartment and c for I’s one, and
that the transmission rate is bI between S and I. In that situation, for all initial
condition and for all positive parameters b, c, and m, the system is convergent
to the equilibrium point (0, 0, 1).
In particular, in that situation, the datum cannot survive a long time in the
UWSN.
Equation 3 can be resolved similarly: from bi∗s∗ + ms∗, we deduce that
s∗ = 0 (as b>0, m>0, and i∗ > 0). So bi∗s∗ − ci∗ −m′i∗ implies that i∗ = 0
too. Finally, from the third line, we conclude that r∗ = 0. Eigenvalues of
the characteristic polynomial of the Jacobian in (0, 0, 0) are −m and −c −m′,
11
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Figure 7: Evolution of the fractions s and i of susceptible and having the datum
sensors with b = 0.4, c = 0.15,m = 0.01, s(0) = 0.9, and i(0) = 0.1, SIR model
with natural death rate in Situations 1 and 3.
which are negative. So this equilibrium point is attractive too, and a similar
proposition than previously can be formulated, with the same conclusion, both
for Situations 1 and 3. Phase spaces for the three situations are provided in
Figure 6 while Fig. 10 depicts the evolution of the fractions s and i in Situations
1 and 3.
To put it in a nutshell, to achieve data survivability in UWSNs, the birth of
awaken sensors must be considered, which is the subject of the next subsection.
4.2 A scheduling process in data survivability
4.2.1 A first natural approach
A first idea to realize a more realistic model of an unattended wireless sen-
sor network is to establish a scheduling process of the sensor nodes, in order
to enhance data survivability for a long period of time. Considering the SIR
model, such a process leads to the division of each compartment in two parts,
corresponding respectively to awaken and to sleeping sensors, as depicted in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8: SIR model with natural death rate and sleeping nodes
Such a model can be reformulated as follows:
ds
dt
= lsˇ− l′s− bis−ms dsˇ
dt
= −lsˇ+ l′s
di
dt
= lˇi− l′i+ bis− ci−mi diˇ
dt
= −lˇi+ l′i
dr
dt
= lrˇ − l′r + ci−mr drˇ
dt
= −lrˇ + l′r.
(4)
The equilibrium point (s∗, sˇ∗, i∗, iˇ∗, r∗, rˇ∗) is searched once again, it satisfies:
lsˇ∗ − l′s∗ − bi∗s∗ −ms∗ = 0 −lsˇ∗ + l′s∗ = 0
lˇi∗ − l′i∗ + bi∗s∗ − ci∗ −mi∗ = 0 −lˇi∗ + l′i∗ = 0
lrˇ∗ − l′r∗ + ci∗ −mr∗ = 0 −lrˇ∗ + l′r∗ = 0.
(5)
Obviously, lsˇ∗ = l′s∗, lˇi∗ = l′i∗, and lrˇ∗ = l′r∗, and so:
(bi∗ +m)s∗ = 0
(bs∗ − c−m)i∗ = 0
ci∗ −mr∗ = 0.
(6)
If s∗ 6= 0, then bi∗+m = 0, which is impossible if it is reasonably supposed that
each rate is > 0. So s∗ = 0, which implies that i∗ = 0, and so r∗ = 0 = rˇ∗ =
iˇ∗ = sˇ∗.
To sum up, in the unique stable equilibrium point, the number of informed
sensors is null, and we face a data loss. This problem is solved in the next
section, by considering that nodes never go to sleep.
4.2.2 Achieving data survivability using birth and death rates
Consider now a new approach proposed to solve the loss of information in the
former scheduling process. In this second approach for scheduling, sensors can
13
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Figure 9: SIR model with natural birth and death rates
only be awaken (we never order them to sleep). It is supposed that a sufficiently
large number of sensors are available, and the question is to determine if it is
possible to determine the lowest birth rate to achieve data survivability for a
long period of time , even in presence of an adversary.
To do so, it is supposed that, at the initial stage, only a small part of the
sensors nodes is awakened. New sensors are then awakened periodically during
the network’s service at a rate l, repopulating by doing so the S compartment
(they never go to sleep). Along with this birth rate, a natural death rate m is
considered for each of the three kind of sensors, while the R compartment is for
corrupted sensors in the original situation 1, as depicted in Figure 9. Remark
that such a model is compatible with living and awaken nodes that have stopped
to transfer the information in Situation 3.
To model such a scenario requires to rewrite the first line of Equation (2),
leading to the following system:
ds
dt
= l − bis−ms
di
dt
= bis− ci−mi
dr
dt
= ci−mr.
(7)
This updated system is the usual SIR model with vital dynamics, in which we
have not supposed the birth and death rates equal. It is possible to show that the
problem is well formulated, as the triangle T = {(s, i) | s > 0, i > 0, s+ i 6 1}
still remains positively invariant.
A study of this system supposes to consider the Poincaré-Bendixon theorem
in phase space and the use of Lyapunov functions [12]. It can however be
understood by considering what will happen to the information in a long run:
will it die out or will it establish itself in the network like an endemic situation
in epidemiological models? The long-term behavior of the solutions, which
depends largely on the equilibrium points that are time-independent solutions
of the system, must be investigated to answer this question. Since these solutions
do not depend on time, we have s′(t) = i′(t) = r′(t) = 0, which leads to the
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system: 
0 = l − bis−ms
0 = bis− (c+m)i
0 = ci−mr.
r = c
m
i from the last equation, and either i = 0 or s = c+m
b
from the second
one. On the one hand, if i = 0, then r = 0, and s = l
m
from the first equation.
This leads to the equilibrium solution(
l
m
, 0, 0
)
.
As the number of sensors having the datum is 0 in this point, it means that if a
solution of the system approaches this equilibrium, the fraction i will approach
0, and the datum tends to disappear from the network: an information-free
equilibrium. Remark that the existence of this equilibrium is independent of the
parameters of the system: it always exists.
On the other hand, if i 6= 0, then s = c+m
b
6= 0 from the second equation,
and l
s
= bi + m according to the first equation. Substituting s and solving for
i, we find
i = bl −m(c+m)
b(c+m) =
R0l −m
b
,
with R0 =
bl
m(c+m) , which is a positive number iff R0 > 1.
R0 is the reproduction number of the information, which tells us how many
secondary informed sensors will one informed sensor produces in an entirely
susceptible network, as:
• a network which consists of only susceptible nodes in a long run has l
msensors;
• c + m is the rate at which sensors leave the I compartment. In other
words, the average time spent as an informed sensor is 1
c+m time units.
• The number of data transmissions per unit of time is given by the incidence
rate bIS. If there is only one informed sensor (I = 1) and every other
sensor is susceptible (S = l
m
) then the number of transmissions by one
“infected” node per unit of time is bl
m
.
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So the number of data transmissions that one informed sensor can achieve during
the entire time it is not attacked if all the reminded sensors are susceptible, is
bl
m(c+m) , that is, R0.
So if R0 > 1, the number of sensors having the datum is strictly positive
in this equilibrium solution: if some other solutions of the system approach
this equilibrium as time goes large, the number of sensors having the datum
will remain strictly positive, and the information remains in the network and
becomes endemic.
These statements are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If either R0 6 1 or s(0) = 0, then any solution (s(t), i(t)) is
convergent to the equilibrium without information (1, 0).
If R0 > 1 then there are two equilibria: the non attractive information-
free equilibrium and the endemic equilibrium. This latter is attractive so that
solutions of the ODE system approach it as time goes to infinity: the information
remains endemic in the UWSN.
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Figure 10: Evolution of the fractions s and i of susceptible and having the
datum sensors, SIR model with natural birth and death rates (R0 = 3.75).
The attacker desire is to have R0 < 1 to tend to an information-free equi-
librium, whereas R0 must be greater than 1 for the sink to face such attack.
If the attacker has the opportunity to observe the network running a certain
duration, then he or she can infer the values of parameters b, c,m, and l. Let N
be the number of data transmissions by one informed node per time unit, that
16
is, N = bl
m
. If the attacker is able to detect and infect the informed nodes in
a time 1
c+m lower than
1
N
, then he or she is sure that R0 < 1: the data will
not survive in the network. The sink interest, for its part, is to have bl
m
large
and 1
c+m low, which can be achieved in the following manner:
• increasing the birth rate b,
• increasing the lifetime of sensors to reduce m,
• increasing the data transmission rate b, but m increases when b increases,
• if possible, reducing c by considering countermeasures against data re-
moval.
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Figure 11: Global SIR model with natural birth and death rates, and sleeping
nodes
Remark finally that this study is compatible with the situation depicted in
Figure 11, in which awaken sensor nodes are allowed to go to sleep. Indeed this
situation, which has not been detailed in this section to avoid making the text
more cumbersome, introduces three new compartments Sˇ, Iˇ, and Rˇ as in the
previous section. However, as we focused on the future of the information in a
long run, we only have to consider equilibrium points that are time-independent
solutions of the system. As shown in the previous section, we obtain dsˇ
dt
=
−ksˇ + k′s = 0, diˇ
dt
= −kiˇ + k′i = 0, and drˇ
dt
= −krˇ + k′r. Consequently,
compartments Sˇ, Iˇ, and Rˇ disappear in the final global system corresponding
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to figure 11: 
ds
dt
= l + ksˇ− k′s− bis−ms dsˇ
dt
= −ksˇ+ k′s
di
dt
= kiˇ− k′i+ bis− ci−mi diˇ
dt
= −kiˇ+ k′i
dr
dt
= +krˇ − k′r + ci−mr drˇ
dt
= −krˇ + k′r,
(8)
and exactly the same Proposition 4 is obtained.
5 The proposed algorithm
In this section, a fully distributed algorithm which supports/covers different
epidemic models is presented and theoretically analyzed. Our algorithm seeks
to ensure data survivability by maintaining a necessary set of safe working nodes
and replacing/locking attacked ones when needed.
In the following, we first focus on the legitimate state formulation and next,
we present the algorithm which consists in only three rules and give the correct-
ness proofs.
5.1 Problem formalization
Let G = (V ;E) the graph modeling the sensor network, with |V | = n and
|E| = m. We assume sensor node identifiers to be unique. Recall that sensor
node identifier is unique if and only if i.Id 6= j.Id holds for each i, j ∈ V (i 6= j).
A sensor node can be in one of these four states: working, probing, sleeping or
locked.
We say that a sensor node i is independent if
i.state = working ∧ (∀j ∈ Ni) (j.state = sleeping ∨ probing ∨ locked)
and that i is dominated if
(i.state = sleeping ∨ probing ∨ locked) ∧ (∃j ∈ Ni) (j.state = working)
The legitimate state (let denote it L) of the network is then expressed as
follows:
∀i ∈ V : i.state = working ⇒ i.compartment = S ∨ I
In other words, each working node is either in S or I.
The following notations are also given for the predicates of node i
- A(i): attacked neighbor: ∃ j ∈ Ni, j.compartment = R
- W (i): working neighbor: ∃ j ∈ Ni, j.state = working
- W ∗(i): working neighbor with lower Id: ∃ j ∈ Ni, j.state = working∧ i.Id > j.Id
- P ∗(i): probing neighbor with lower Id: ∃ j ∈ Ni, j.state = probing ∧ i.Id > j.Id
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5.2 The algorithm
The proposed algorithm uses the following three rules:
r1:
if i.state = probing ∧W (i) then
if j.compartment = I then
i.compartment← I (*the datum is transferred/replicated to/on i*)
end if
i.state← sleeping
end if
r2:
if i.state = probing ∧ (¬W (i) ∧ ¬P ∗(i) ∨A(i)) then
if A(i) then
j.state← locked (*node j remains locked until its healing/recovery*)
end if
i.state← working
end if
r3:
if i.state = working ∧W ∗(i) then
if i.compartment = S ∧ j.compartment = I then
i.compartment← I (*the datum is transferred/replicated to/on i*)
end if
i.state← sleeping
end if
5.3 Correctness proofs
Lemma 1 If a node changes to the working state by r2, then it remains in its
state and will never execute a rule again until an eventual attack.
Proof Let i be a sensor node that executes r2. According to the preconditions
of all rules, node i can execute only rule r3 in the next round. However, in order
to do so, one of its neighbors would have to change into working state by r2.
This is impossible as long as node i is in the working state. Thus, node i will
never execute a rule again. If node i is attacked, it will be locked by r2 and
remains in its state until its healing/recovery. After that, it will join the set of
sleeping nodes.
Lemma 2 If a sensor node is enabled by rule r2, then each one of its neighbors
will execute at most one more rule until their next wakeup/probing, and this
rule will be r1.
Proof Let i be a node that executes r2. When node i changes to working state,
all its neighbors are either in sleeping or probing or locked state. So we have
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three possible scenarios: i) neighbors in sleeping state: there is no conflict in this
case. ii) neighbors with probing state: those neighbors have a higher Id than
i. iii) locked neighbors will remain in their state until their healing/recovery
before joining the set of sleeping nodes.
Lemma 3 Every sensor node is either independent or dominated or locked.
Proof From the point of view of node i, we have three scenarios:
- if node i is in the working state and is not independent, then i may execute
rule r3.
- if node i is in the sleeping ∨ probing state and is not dominated, then node i
may execute rule r2.
- if node i is in the locked state, then node i will remain in its state until its
healing/recovery.
Lemma 4 When a node is not locked ∨ sleeping, it can make at most 2 moves.
Proof By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, each rule can be executed at most once by
a node. Hence, the only case a node makes two moves is when it executes r3
then r2 with a working state.
Theorem 1 With respect to the legitimate state L of the network, the proposed
algorithm converges within 2n moves.
Proof This follows from Lemma 1 to Lemma 4.
6 Simulations
This section is dedicated to the evaluation of the SIR approach through ex-
periments. We will show, using both the mathematical modeling and a basic
wireless sensor network designed in Python, that taking place in the conditions
of Proposition 4 is a guarantee to achieve information survivability in WSNs.
6.1 Mathematics-based simulations
In this first illustration written in Python language, the initial number of sus-
ceptible sensors is set to 300 while 3 nodes initially receive the datum. System 8
is then discretized and 4 experiments have been conducted, leading twice to the
situation R0 < 1, and twice to the opposite situation.
Figure 12 shows the obtained result. We can see that the I compartment
is never empty when R0 > 1, leading to a data survivability in this SIR model
simulation. Conversely, when R0 < 1, the information is obviously lost.
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6.2 Networks simulation using Python
In this second set of experiments, we show that the time period of the presence
of the information can be extended in a wireless sensor network simulated with
Python, and when satisfying Proposition 4.
We have firstly deployed N = 100 sensors, all belonging in the susceptible
compartment, and with respect to the algorithm detailed in the previous section.
In the initial condition, each sensor has a probability of 10% to have detected
an intrusion (this is the information). At each time unit, an average of lN new
sensors are awaken. For each informed sensor and for each of its susceptible
neighbor, the data is sent with a probability bI. The death rate of each sensor
is set to m (each awaken sensor has the probability m to empty its battery
during the considered time unit), while each informed sensor has a probability
c to loose the information (to move in the R compartment). The whole network
is observed during 60 time units.
We have firstly set l = 0.017, m = 0.0018, c = 0.035, and b = 0.33, which
leads to R0 = 84.69, and to the situation depicted in Figure 13(a). In this
experiment, * symbols have been used for the susceptible sensors, × for the
informed ones, a circle is for the recovered ones, while the straight line counts
the number of dead sensors. A second set of parameters has led to R0 = 0.06,
and to the situation described in Figure 13(b).
6.3 100 experiments with random parameters
We have then launched the previous simulator 100 times with random parame-
ters. At each simulation, probability l is randomly picked in the interval [0,0.2[,
m is chosen in [0,0.01[, c is picked in [0,0.1[, while b is in [0,0.033[, in order to
be close to a real situation while having R0 < 1 and R0 > 1 both represented.
During these 100 experiments, we have obtained 39 times the situation R0 < 1
with an average of 0.34 (and 61 times the situation R0 > 1, 16.05 of average).
We found an average number of informed sensors equal to 15.50 in the first
situation, while it is the double in the second one (33.12 informed sensors in
average). In 7 of the 39 simulations with R0 < 1 (17.95%), the number of
informed sensors has reached 0, while the information has disappeared 2 times
during the 61 other simulations (3.27%). The minimum of informed sensors is
attained at the 35-th time unit (in average) in the first situation, while we reach
it earlier in the second one (31-th time unit).
To sum up, the information has disappeared in 3.27% of the simulations when
R0 > 1, while it has been lost in 17.95% of the cases in the second situation.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented an efficient technique that uses epidemic domain models
in the context of data survival in unattended WSNs. We studied two models
(SIR and SIS) that can ensure the survivability of the datum in presence of dif-
ferent types of attacks. We showed that our method is well adapted to UWSN
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scenarios. In a second step, we proposed and analyzed an efficient distributed
algorithm to tackle the problem of data survivability. In future work, the au-
thors’ intention is to take into account the possibility of aggregation layers in
the wireless sensor networks [1]: aggregators could transfer only one alert signal
for all their neighborhood.
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(a) R0 = 118.51
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Figure 12: Simulation of SIR model with birth and death rates and various R0
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(a) R0 = 84.69
(b) R0 = 0.06
Figure 13: Simulation of a wireless sensor network
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